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Abstract—Practical solutions to bootstrap security in today’s
information and communication systems critically depend on
centralized services for authentication as well as key and trust
management. This is particularly true for mobile users. Identity
providers such as Google or Facebook have active user bases of
two billion each, and the subscriber number of mobile operators
exceeds five billion unique users as of early 2018. If these
centralized services go completely ‘dark’ due to natural or man
made disasters, large scale blackouts, or country-wide censorship,
the users are left without practical solutions to bootstrap security
on their mobile devices. Existing distributed solutions, for in-
stance, the so-called web-of-trust are not sufficiently lightweight.
Furthermore, they support neither cross-application on mobile
devices nor strong protection of key material using hardware
security modules. We propose Sea of Lights (SOL), a practical
lightweight scheme for bootstrapping device-to-device security
wirelessly, thus, enabling secure distributed self-organized net-
works. It is tailored to operate ‘in the dark’ and provides strong
protection of key material as well as an intuitive means to build
a lightweight web-of-trust. SOL is particularly well suited for
local or urban operation in scenarios such as the coordination
of emergency response, where it helps containing/limiting the
spreading of misinformation. As a proof of concept, we implement
SOL in the Android platform and hence test its feasibility on real
mobile devices. We further evaluate its key performance aspects
using simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Users of mobile applications heavily rely on third party
providers to offer basic security services. In fact, practical
solutions to bootstrap security in today’s information and
communication systems critically depend on such third party
security services for authentication as well as key and trust
management. These systems are commonly designed in a
centralized fashion and scale to billions of users—making
them attractive for application developers/providers as well
as end users, which do not want to burden themselves with
alternate means of securing their apps.
If these centralized services go completely ‘dark’ due to
natural or man made disasters [1], large scale blackouts [2], or
country-wide censorship [3], the users are left without practical
solutions to bootstrap security on their mobile devices. As a
result mobile app usage is severely restricted to support users
in such scenarios.
Distributed solutions to bootstrap security such as the web-
of-trust (WOT) exist. However, existing approaches are still
complex and require educated users [4]. Moreover, most cur-
rent WOT solutions are ill-suited for cross-application support
on mobile devices and do not support strong protection of key
material by means of hardware security modules.
In this work, we propose Sea of Lights (SOL)1, a practical
lightweight scheme for bootstrapping device-to-device security
and for wirelessly spreading it to enable secure distributed self-
organized networks. SOL is designed to complement existing
self-organized network solutions by providing a lightweight
and agile solution for decentralized authentication, key ma-
nagement, and trust management.
Any third party mobile app can utilize the services of
SOL, which offers an interface to access its security services.
The security configuration can be performed on per-app gran-
ularity. Public/private key pairs generated by a third party
application (=sub-keys) can be authenticated with SOL. Hence,
our framework registers the public key of a sub-key, signs it,
issues a certificate and is further responsible for its distribution.
To this end, SOL comprises two layers. (1) The Trust Man-
agement Layer, which manages all operations related with
trust relations. It is in charge of bootstrapping on demand,
and of creating and maintaining trust relations. (2) The Key
Management Layer, which is responsible for generating key
material and managing the access to these keys in a secure
fashion. This layer cares for, e.g., choosing an appropriate key
storage according to the hardware capabilities and the available
secure elements on the mobile devices.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are the follow-
ing:
• We introduce SOL, a cross-application framework for
bootstrapping security in device-to-device communica-
tion settings.
• As part of SOL, we design and implement an automatic
and decentralized key and trust management solution for
mobile devices. It adapts to the hardware capabilities of
the host device and is able to utilize hardware security
solutions to further improve the security of the underlying
keys.
• We evaluate the performance of SOL on real devices
to demonstrate and test its feasibility in practice and
further assess its key performance features by means of
simulation.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we sum-
marize related work. In Section III, we concisely introduce
1The name is inspired by silent protests such as candlelight vigils, where
light is spread among the candles of a large group of people, effectively
forming a ‘sea of lights’.
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our motivating scenario, the system model, and the adversary
model. Section IV describes the design and introduces the
architectural concepts of the SOL framework, while Section V
provides implementation details. We present the results of the
evaluation of SOL in Section VI, covering both, measurements
from our Android implementation as well as simulation results.
Finally, in Section VII, we critically discuss implementation
and performance issues, point to future work, and draw a
conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing work in the field of security in decentralized net-
works focuses mainly on the communication, providing secure
routing protocols solutions [5], [6], improving the fairness
of the users in the network [7], increasing the robustness
of such networks by detecting corrupt nodes [8], [9], etc.
Our work aims at proposing a solution to bootstrap security
services, while integrating a scheme for authentication and
key and trust management in a decentralized fashion. Quite
a number of studies focusing on trust establishment [10] and
key exchange using mobile devices have also been extensively
analyzed [11], [12]. Furthermore, there are also some pro-
posals using existing security hardware on smartphones [13]
and how these can be exploited to create different security
levels. However, most of them either assume the existence
of servers or lack an evaluation in both simulation and real
devices. Our work differs from the aforementioned solutions
in that we propose, inspired by the approaches based on
WOT model [14], [15], a more bare-bones implementation
of decentralized authentication to make it more practical.
Yet, our scheme offers cross-application support and easy
integration into existing apps. In our proposed scheme, each
entity creates its public/private key and—after handshaking—
issues certificates for its neighbors. In addition, we consider
the use of secure elements to provide a secure mechanism of
key management locally in the devices. Finally, we investigate
the performance by means of simulation, and we test our
implementation on real devices.
III. SCENARIO AND SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the emergency response com-
munication scenario that serves as a running example through-
out the paper. We further present the general SOL system
model as well as the adversary model.
A. Emergency Response Communication Scenario
Recent disasters [1]–[3] severely affected the information
and communication capabilites of the population by damaging
infrastructure, making communication systems unavailable, or
knocking out the power. As a result, millions of people in
need for help were literally left ‘in the dark’, without ready-
to-use access to backup power and striped even of basic
means of communication. A number of technical solutions
exist to enable civilian volunteers and rescuers to build self-
organized distributed wireless networks, thus enabling the
population to communicate without relying on a centralized
infrastructure. These networks build on user participation
and leverage mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) or delay-
tolerant networks (DTN) technology to facilitate message
routing/forwarding/spreading in the affected area. A typical
assumption in emergency scenarios is that only honest users
participate in establishing and running the network, and exis-
ting solutions often forgo security means [16]. As a result,
users with malicious intend may limit or affect the commu-
nication, thus causing serious threats on the credibility and
reliability of the data. Throughout the rest of this paper, we
will use the aforementioned emergency response scenario as a
running example. However, this does not limit the generality
of the proposed SOL framework.
B. System Model
We consider users owning mobile devices capable of direct
device-to-device communication. In the following, we use
the term entity to refer to the logical entity formed by an
authorized user and her device. Each device is imprinted
with an identity, which is unique and unchangeable. For a
smartphone this could be the International Mobile Equipment
Identity (IMEI), a unique device fingerprint, etc. Each device
has a mechanism to discover devices in its proximity such
as a one-hop neighbor discovery mechanism. Applications
running on the devices are assumed to be independent from
each other, i.e., each application can define its own set of
security requirements. No prior trust relationships or secu-
rity association between entities exist, i.e., no information
or knowledge about other entities is stored on a device
beforehand. Centralized infrastructure to bootstrap security is
unavailable. By means of direct contact and with the users
in the loop, pairwise trust relationship between entities can
be established. Note that we do not assume any technology
for the data routing/forwarding/spreading, since SOL operates
agnostic to such mechanisms.
C. Adversary Model
We assume adversaries that can act passively or actively as
insiders, i.e., our adversary is a regular user of the network.
Adversary capabilities follow the Dolev-Yao assumptions [17]:
the adversary is, hence, capable of active interception or mo-
dification of traffic, she can fabricate and destroy messages, but
is not able to break cryptographic primitives. The key goal of
SOL being to bootstrap security, i.e., to provide authentication,
key management and trust management services to the users,
we define the main attack goals to be to disrupt these services.
In particular, this entails to impersonate other entities within
the network.
IV. SEA OF LIGHTS FRAMEWORK DESIGN AND
ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we highlight the design concept and architec-
ture of the proposed SOL framework. We explain the technical
realization in detail in Section V. SOL is a framework that pro-
vides cross-application security services for device-to-device
communication settings. Our architecture comprises a key
management as well as a trust management component, which
are managed and developed as two independent elements.
A. Decentralized Authentication
The proposed decentralized authentication is based on a
simplified version of the WOT paradigm, where each mobile
device generates its own public/private key pair and signs the
public key of others devices. Similar to other WOT solutions,
trust in SOL is determined by a trust level and a maximum
certification path, the so-called degree. We define the trust
levels as follows.
• Ultimate (U) for the owner,
• Trusted (T) for direct trust relations, where an object
signed directly by U is trusted,
• Known (K) for transitive relations (second degree and
further), where a object signed directly by (T) is known,
or an object signed by n-K is defined as known. n
represents the minimum number of known signatures
required to validate an unknown signature. Additionally,
the degree defines if a transitive relation can still be
considered known. We do not set a fixed value of n and
degree, but allow for user configuration. This enables to
tune the scalability of the system to different use cases.
In our approach, trust management is carried out in two main
steps, each implemented using a dedicated protocol. The hand-
shake protocol covers the bootstrapping and establishment of
mutual trust, and the synchronization protocol manages the
unidirectional synchronization of the local trust repository.
We denote a public key as pk, e.g., pk[a] is the pu-
blic key of Device A. Note that a certificate is represented
as signature[issuer, subject], where subject is the device
whose public key was signed, and issuer is the device who
signed the public key of the subject, e.g., signature[a, b]
represents the certificate of pk[b] issued by Device A.
1) Handshake Protocol: Figure 1 illustrates the data flow
between two devices performing the handshake protocol. It
consists in the exchange of public keys and signatures be-
tween devices in proximity, in order to establish a direct
trust relationship between two devices. The key verification
is performed using existing Out-of-Band (OoB) verification
methods (see V-A). Since comparing all bytes of public keys
can be tedious and susceptible to errors, we use a short
representation of these called fingerprint. In our approach, a
fingerprint is the cryptographic hash value of any given public
key. Once the OoB fingerprint verification is successful, the
devices generate a certificate and assign a trust level according
to the process mentioned previously. These certificates are
then exchanged between devices and stored locally in their
repositories.
2) Synchronization Protocol: Once a trust relationship has
been bootstrapped, the devices can obtain information about
the transitive trust relations. Figure 2 clarifies this process.
The synchronization of the trust repository between two de-
vices operates as follows: Device A requests from Device
B information related to a set of known devices, Device B
responds with the public keys and signatures related to the
Device A Device B
signature[b,b] is validopt
OoB fingerprint verification is successfulopt
signature [b,a] is validopt
1 : send pk[a],signature[a,a]
9 : add signature [b,a]
8 : receive signature [b,a]
7 : send signature [a,b]
6 : add signature [a,b] to trust repository
5 : sign pk[b] with sk[a]
4 : add signature[b,b] to trust repository
3 : add pk[b] to trust repository
2 : receive pk[b], signature[b,b]
Collaboration1::Interaction1::HandshakeProtocol
Fig. 1. Bootstrapping trust process from Device A’s perspective
queried devices. Finally, Device A merges the information into
its local trust repository.
Device A Device B
foreach remaining signature[y,z]loop
foreach associated pk[x], signature [x,x]loop
signature[x,x] is validopt
pk[y],pk[z] exist in trust repositoryopt
signature[y,z] is validopt
1 : request information related to known devices
3 : add pk[x] to trust repository
4 : add signature [x,x] to trust repository
5 : add signature[y,z] to trust repository
2 : send related public keys, signatures
Fig. 2. Unidirectional synchronization process from Device A’s perspective
B. Key Management
The key management component is responsible for the man-
agement and protection of the private authentication keys from
misuse and key extraction. The proposed solution is designed
and implemented as a flexible solution, where the methods
for the key management can be hardware- or software-based
solutions. It depends on the methods supported by the devices,
e.g., keys can be stored in external Near-Field Communication
(NFC) tokens, TEE-based storage as AndroidKeyStore, etc.
Note that irrespective of the method, the selected storage
method requires a PIN, password or an additional unlock
mechanism. Our approach involves two group of keys: (1)
the initial authentication key, which only aims to achieve
authentication and trust between the devices; and (2) sub-keys.
Sub-keys are public/private key pairs, which can be used
to provide additional security properties, e.g., confidentiality.
These keys are generated by a third party app and authenti-
cated with our framework using the initial authentication key.
C. Architecture
As shown in Fig. 3, SOL is designed as a two-layer
framework, which handles both trust and key management.
It resides on the application layer of the Android architecture.
Out-Of-Band	Key	Verification
Visual	
Comparison
Hardware	
Key	Storage
SIM	
Card
NFC	
tokens ...
Software
Key	Storage
Android
KeyStorage
Bouncy Castle
KeyStorage ...
.....
QR-Code	
Scanning
NFC	
proximity ...
Trust	
Repository
SoL Android	Service
Trust	Management	Layer
Key	Management	Layer
Fig. 3. The SOL architecture is designed as an Android service
1) Trust Management Layer: The main task of this layer
is the maintenance of the trust relationships on a device. It
includes the management of the trust repository, controlling
the data, e.g., existing public keys, certificates, sub-key cer-
tificates, as well as checking the validity and trustworthiness of
incoming data. Furthermore, this layer performs the protocols
mentioned in IV-A: handshake and synchronization.
2) Key Management Layer: The main goal of this layer is
the initialization of the authentication private key, and the sup-
port of additional operations where the initial authentication
key is involved. It includes to sign keys, to issue certificates,
etc. Moreover, this layer controls whether a storage is unlocked
before performing any cryptographic operation. Whenever the
storage is locked, a user interaction is needed for unlocking it,
e.g., by introducing a password, lock pattern, PIN, etc. This
layer also offers an interface to the upper Trust Management
Layer.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We developed the SOL framework for the Android platform
and implemented it as a bound service2 (=SOL service)
by using Android Interface Definition Language3. The SOL
service is encapsulated inside a standalone Android application
running in its own process. It implements the trust and key
management layers defined in IV-C. In the following, we
discuss the most important implementation details for all SOL
components.
A. Trust Management Layer
We use fingerprints and key IDs to identify a longer key
with a short representation. The fingerprint is calculated using
SHA-256, and the key ID is derived from the 64 LSBs of
the public key. We create a directory that contains all data
concerning trust relations for each known device (=subjects).
The directory’s name is the hexadecimal representation of the
fingerprint for a subject public key. The directory contains the
subject public key, signatures over the subject public key, as
well as all sub-keys and their respective certificates attached to
the subject. All these data are serialized and stored persistently
as Base64-encoded files. The generated files are located in the
application private directory.
This layer is also responsible for the key verification.
After successful completion of the handshake protocol, the
key exchanged in this protocol needs to be authenticated.
Our framework allows for easy extensibility by facilitating
the new implementation, extension, or replacement of key
authentication modules. Currently, we have implemented the
following existing authentication mechanisms:
• Visual comparison: The remote and the own fingerprint
are color-coded and displayed to the users as shown in
Fig. 4.
• Scanning a QR code: Both fingerprints are encoded in
Base64 and encapsulated in a QR code as shown in Fig.
4. The user is required to scan the remote QR code. The
scanning is performed using the ZXing (Zebra Crossing)
project [18].
• Using NFC technology: When the devices are in close
proximity, they exchange the fingerprints automatically.
B. Key Management Layer
The Key Management Layer implements the necessary
mechanisms to provide a modular and flexible key storage
solution. Thus, this layer is split into the following sub-
modules:
• SoftwareKeyManager: This sub-module supplies a
software-based keystore solution developed for Android
versions before 4.3. The keystore is based on the Bouncy
Castle library. The files generated in this module are
protected using a user-provided PIN or pass-phrase.
• AndroidKeyManager: The AndroidKeyManager is the
solution for Android versions from 4.3 on. This module
2https://developer.android.com/guide/components/bound-services.html
3https://developer.android.com/guide/components/aidl.html
Fig. 4. Example of two key verification methods implemented in SOL
utilizes the official Android API keystore, which intro-
duces an application private credential storage concept,
but also (if available) enables additional security by
offering support for hardware-based solutions.
• HardwareKeyManager: The HardwareKeyManager
represents an additional abstraction layer for the key
storage. It is the basis module for all hardware-based
solutions, as all these solutions employ a similar protocol
based on certain Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU)
commands to communicate with Java Card Applets. Our
current implementation covers three hardware-based so-
lutions, which include the key storage and also perform
the required signature operations: (1) SmartcardManager
handles the communication with NFC smart cards. (2)
SeekManager supports the connection to available rea-
ders, e.g., UICC. The Seek Manager manages the com-
munication with the existing SEEK for Android frame-
work [19]. (3) YubiKeyManager permits the communica-
tion with YubiKey NEO hardware tokens [20].
C. Solution-dependent Settings
In our implementation, we abstract the network layer tasks,
that is, neighbor discovery and data transmission. This abstrac-
tion allows to replace the ad-hoc communication with another
technology at any time. In our proof-of-concept, we used Wi-
Fi Direct as the ad-hoc communication technology.
Moreover, we prioritize the selection of the key manager
according to the solutions supported by the device.
1) Configurable Properties: We define several properties as
configurable:
• maxdegree: defines the maximum number of transitive
relations that can still be considered valid.
• numknown: fixes the number of required known signa-
tures to validate an unknown signature.
• maxsubkeys: determines the maximum number of sub-
keys that an application can register.
• signaturealgorithm: represents the selected signature
algorithm, e.g., RSA or ECDSA.
2) Choosing the most suitable key manager: Our selection
prioritizes the hardware-based solutions. During the initia-
lization of the SOL service, it checks whether any reader is
available. If it exists, the SeekManager is chosen. If it does
not exist, we ask the user if she wants to utilize other sup-
ported hardware-based method, e.g., SmartcardKeyManager or
YubiKeyManger. Otherwise, we examine the running Android
version and automatically select the suitable software-based
module.
D. Integration SOL Android service by third party applica-
tions
We provide a proxy library (=SOL library) that allows an
app to communicate with the SOL service in a simple and
direct fashion.
Device	A Device	B
- Exchange of public keys and signature
- Verification
• Signatures
• Fingerprints over secure channel
- Signing public key and exchange issued
certificate
App	1
SoL Lib
ic 	
SoL Service
TML
KML
App	1
SoL Lib
Device	B
SoL Service
TML
KML
Fig. 5. SOL Android service performing the handshake protocol
Device	A Device	B
Synchronization and update	of the trust
repository
• Fingerprints
• Public	keys
• Pk- signatures
• Sub-keys
• Sub-key signatures
App	1
SoL Lib
ic 	
SoL Service
TML
KML
App	1
SoL Lib
Device	B
SoL Service
TML
KML
Exchange	of data using sub-keys
Fig. 6. SOL Android service performing the synchronization protocol
The main tasks of this proxy library include:
• Validate the installation, availability and successful ini-
tialization of the SOL service.
• Trigger the service to start the handshake protocol.
• Check existing trust relationships with a neighbor.
• Retrieve additional information about a neighbor.
• Request and register app specific sub-key certificates.
• Return the sub-keys associated to a specific fingerprint.
To clarify the use of our SOL framework, we assume the
following scenario. Let App 1 be a chat app that wants to
provide a secure communication between devices in a decen-
tralized manner. For doing so, it creates a sub-key using an
asymmetric algorithm scheme. To benefit from our framework,
App 1 uses the SOL library to register the generated public
key in our framework. Hence, the SOL service signs the key
and issues a certificate. Finally, the certificate and the public
key are stored in our local trust repository. Then, the SOL
service takes care of the distribution and synchronization of
the public key as well as its certificate. It implies that multiple
apps running on a smartphone neither need to build nor to
maintain their own trust repository. Figures 5 and 6 show the
data flow between devices in the aforementioned scenario.
VI. EVALUATION
TABLE I
EXPERIMENT SETTINGS
Scenario Dimensions w x h 3000 x 3000 [m]
Simulation duration 12 [h], i.e., 720 [min] or 43200[s]
Number of nodes 120
Experiment 6 ( 3 trust degree x 2 signature algorithm)
Runs 5 per experiment
Mobility Model RWP
Speed 0.5, 1.5 [m/s]
Routing Algorithm DirectContact
Buffer size 20 [MB]
Communication Transmit speed 2 [Mbps]
Transmission range 10 [m]
Trust management Maximum trust degree 1 (direct) - 3
Key management Number of Sub-keys 3
Size per Sub-key 4096 bit
Signature algorithm RSA (2048 bit)
ECDSA (256 bit)
The goal of the evaluation is twofold. First, we inves-
tigate the performance and scalability aspects of the trust
management and the key management layer by means of
simulation using the Opportunistic Network Simulator (ONE)
[21]. Second we demonstrate and test our implementation on
real devices to show its feasibility and test the computational
performance of the key management part (see also [22] for
existing performance studies of the employed algorithms).
A. Trust Management
Detailed simulation settings for the ONE are provided in
Table I. We analyze four evaluation metrics for this layer: the
propagation of trust relations, memory consumption, band-
width consumption and computational overhead. The maxi-
mum degree of transitive trust relations varies from [1,3]. Each
node starts with a maximum of 3 sub-keys. Each experiment
runs for 12 hours (720 minutes) and nodes exchange their
data every 10 seconds, if in proximity. The plots show aver-
ages over 6 different experiments: one per transitivity degree
(degrees 1 to 3) using 2 possible signature algorithms (RSA or
ECDSA). Each run is seeded with numbers from the interval
[1,5], resulting in a total 30 runs. We use BouncyCastle JCA
for signing and key generation operations. We show average
values and omit the confidence intervals, which are sufficiently
small and would hamper readability.
1) Trust relationships: Figure 7 shows the number of direct
trust relationships as well as the implicit relationships. While
implicit relationships increase exponentially, the direct trust
indicates a linear property. The number of direct trust rela-
tionships remains almost the same and it does not depend on
the maximum certification path. But rather, it varies according
to the number of performed handshakes between devices.
2) Memory and bandwidth consumption: For this expe-
riment, we determine the file size required for public keys,
signatures, sub-keys and sub-keys signatures in the repository.
TABLE II
PROOF-OF-CONCEPT SETTINGS
Scenario Signature algorithm RSA (2048 bit)
ECDSA (256 bit)
Devices 1 ThinkPad X220, 8GB RAM, Ubuntu 64 bit
1 Google Nexus 5, Android version 6.0
1 YubiKey NEO (NFC token)
Procedure I. Key Generation 2 key-pairs (kp1,kp2)
1 invalid signature
II. Issue signatures 1000 by kp1
200 by kp2
III. Verifications 1000 (valid)
200 (invalid)
As depicted in Figure 8, the memory consumption is directly
influenced by the selected trust degree as well as the signature
algorithm.
First, our results confirm the existing findings regarding
both algorithms: RSA exhibits higher memory usage than
ECDSA for the generation of the primitives public key, sub-
keys and the signatures. As the number of collecting signatures
of known devices increases with each neighbor encounter, the
storage space in the repository is mainly occupied by signa-
tures. This in turn implies a considerable memory overhead,
thus each node collects and stores signatures according to the
trust degree selected.
Figures 9 and 10 show the bandwidth overhead and usage
required for the handshake and the synchronization phase. Al-
though, the bandwidth usage is constant during the handshake
protocol, it increases rapidly in the synchronization phase
depending on the selected maximum degree of trust relations.
Furthermore, if we split the data transferred during the
synchronization phase into query and response operations,
we notice that query operations account for the overwhelming
part of usage bandwidth during the synchronization, which
further increases with increasing trust degree. This is a very
important result: on one hand, a trust degree higher than one is
important to scale up the WOT faster, on the other hand such
higher degree burdens the network and, thus, may impact the
expansion of the WOT due to overload situations. In Section
VII we suggest possible optimization mechanisms to minimize
this issue.
3) Computational Overhead: We analyze the computa-
tional overhead of our solution based on numbers of operations
realized during the simulation. Because these number of
operations is the same for both signature algorithms, we do
not separate the results into ECDSA and RSA. As shown in
Figure 11, verification represents the most significant operation
performance wise. Its growth is exponential and directly
associated to the trust degree.
B. Key Management Layer
A proof-of-concept of SOL was implemented on Android-
based smartphones to demonstrate the feasibility of our frame-
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Fig. 7. Propagation of direct and indirect trust in the network
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Fig. 8. Comparison of memory consumption using different cryptographic algorithms
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Fig. 9. Bandwidth usage during: (a) handshake phase, (b) synchronization phase: total (left) - query and response operations (right)
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Fig. 10. Bandwidth usage during synchronization phase: total (time plots) and query and response operations (pie plots)
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Fig. 11. Computational overhead: total numbers of signing and verification operations during the simulation
work on real devices.
The evaluation of this layer covers the two supported
cryptographic algorithm, and compares both in terms of
efficiency and performance. Additionally, we compare
hardware- and software-based key storage mechanisms.
Detailed experiment settings are provided in Table II. The
hardware-based storage experiment is performed with a
smartphone and a NFC token.
Additionally, we use a laptop for the software-based storage
experiment. We repeat the experiment 15 times.
Each iteration takes place as follows:
1) First, two key pairs are generated: kp1 that is considered
as valid, and kp2 which issues invalid signatures. It
means a signature is valid only if it was issued by kp1.
2) After the key generation, kp1 issues 1000 signatures, and
kp2 issues 200 signatures.
3) Finally, the issued signatures are verified using kp1.
Figure 12 shows the performance of RSA and ECDSA
executing cryptographic operations: generation, signing, and
verification. ECDSA has a better performance regarding key
generation and issuing signatures. RSA, however, is more
efficient for verifying signatures. Note that the hardware-based
approach offers a poor performance for signing operations,
since the processor embedded in the NFC token is relatively
slow. Notwithstanding, this result depends directly on the capa-
bilities in terms of cryptographic operations supported by the
token. For example, if a token has a dedicated cryptographic
co-processor for such operations, it will be faster compared
with another one who performs cryptographic operations on
the regular micro-processor.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper presented SOL, a practical framework to boot-
strap security for device-to-device settings. SOL is designed
and implemented as an Android service. SOL uses asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms: RSA and ECDSA. It also imple-
ments a simplified version of the WOT paradigm. It features a
Trust Management Layer and a Key Management Layer. The
former manages all operations and methods related with the
trust relations: bootstrapping, maintaining and synchroniza-
tion. It deals also with the OoB key verification. The latter
performs all operations concerning to the underlying keys:
initialization, generation and management. It supports both
software and hardware-based key storage solutions.
Furthermore, third party apps which utilize our library can
benefit from our framework by offering an authenticated
and secure communication. To this end, they can create
and register the application-specific sub-keys in our service.
Finally, the implementation of a proof-of-concept demons-
trates the feasibility of our solution on real devices. Simulation
results confirm the trade-off between trust transitivity and
synchronization overhead: transitive trust facilitates a much
faster coverage, while direct trust is conserving bandwidth,
but limits trust coverage. We make our source code publicly
available [23].
We foresee a number of performance improvements. Introdu-
cing the concept of a timeout interval together with a register
to remember users and timestamp of previous encounters can
help saving bandwidth. Then, a new synchronization with a
specific user is only allowed after the timeout has expired.
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Fig. 12. Performance comparison between RSA and ECDSA executing cryptographic operations
Furthermore, we can also employ bloom filters for checking
already known or trusted users. Thus, it constrains the query
part from the synchronization phase.
Finally, even tough our scheme builds on direct physical
interaction of users and the trust level of transitive relations
can be configured. I.e. there is a certain control on how far
information generated by malicious devices will spread into
the network. There are still open issues that are only partially
covered or not covered by our solution, for example, an impor-
tant aspect remains the implementation of methods focused on
the revocation of compromised keys in decentralized networks.
Indeed, key revocation plays an importante role for keeping
security in a network as a compromised key can affect the trust
of the system partially or totally. However, as summarized in
[24], there is no one-for-all key revocation scheme which deals
with all the security issues and requirements of such networks.
For example, many of them assume the existence of a central
authority or a prior known of the network topology, which is
not always possible especially in mobile real-world systems,
where devices can join and leave the network arbitrarily.
Several schemes rely on the information provided by the
devices in the network in order to deal with misbehaving users.
However, this can also be used by malicious users to affect
the network and to disable legitimate devices.
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